Trita Parsi: Massive Houthi Victory Transforms U.S.-Iran War

Houthis have reportedly conquered a large Red Sea territory including islands north of Bab el-Mandeb, and Bessent's claim of cheap oil ahead is wishful thinking or lies

The Houthi advance is more strategically significant than the Hormuz tactical gain and could allow closure of Bab el-Mandeb, jeopardizing the Saudi pipeline; time was not on the U.S.'s side as claimed

The Strait of Hormuz will soon become strategically insignificant and oil will return to $40

Up to a third of global oil flow is at risk from closure of both straits; U.S. cannot reopen both given destroyed regional logistics; rerouting costs will spike prices; China's demand fluctuations are a leverage signal to Trump ahead of Xi's visit

Iran "just blew the whole thing up" regarding U.S. logistical infrastructure in Bahrain

Saudis reportedly pleaded with Trump to bomb Yemen directly, and Trump reportedly declined

Trump told the Saudis to bomb themselves without direct U.S. involvement, showing Saudi dependence despite having the weapons and green light; the Houthis act independently of Iran unlike Hezbollah

The regional ceasefire was an essential Iranian demand; its collapse fueled the war's spread, and any future deal must include a broader regional ceasefire framework

Houthis will demand the blockade's lifting and Iran will demand its own blockade lifted; Saudis maintain the blockade to contain the Houthis, and their interception of the funeral-related plane triggered the current escalation, which is backfiring

Saudi Arabia faces an all-or-nothing dilemma between intensified blockade conflict or letting the Houthis grow stronger through peace

Iran struck bases in Jordan and demonstrated capability to threaten U.S. ships via a warning strike that forced a vessel to vacate

Iran has not sunk a U.S. ship only because it chose not to, not for lack of capability

Trump is tweeting, based on a false information vacuum, that Iran is about to cave, when reality shows no strategic shift has occurred

No panic detected among Iranian contacts recently, unlike in earlier war phases

Recent developments benefit Iranian leverage, but the escalation risks losing the earlier degree of control

Iran genuinely wants a diplomatic exit but is deeply frustrated that Trump lacks interest or capacity to make/sustain a deal, a situation worse for Iran since it cannot simply leave the conflict

Iran reportedly may shift to preemptive strikes, aided by reported long-range/hypersonic missile capability

The U.S. lost control of the war's geography and timing from day one; any Iranian attack occurs within an ongoing war the U.S. never ended, not as a new preemptive act

Trump is likely to push for a full-scale "round three" with Israeli involvement after the midterms/Israeli elections, and Iran may initiate that round itself beforehand to control the timing

Saudi Arabia and Qatar have effectively disengaged, Oman never joined, and Kuwait/Bahrain lack leverage; regional mediators lack real leverage over Iran or the U.S.

China has leverage over both the U.S. and Iran and could be pushed toward mediating and sustaining a deal if a highly escalated round three threatens global energy markets

A China-brokered peace restoring the old U.S.-centric status quo might not actually serve China's long-term interests compared to Iran pushing the U.S. out of the region

There is roughly an 80% chance of a round three, in which Israel will very likely join and go further than before

Iran's strikes on Jordanian bases aim to degrade infrastructure Israel would need to defend against Iranian missiles in a future round

Israel cannot be deterred as long as Netanyahu is prime minister and the U.S. remains willing to escalate, since Israel sees this as a last chance

Iran deliberately favors calibrated pressure like the Houthi blockade over riskier moves such as sinking a U.S. ship, reserving that option for a worse crisis point

A poll shows Israel's U.S. public standing dropped 67 points in 8 years, now net negative, driving bipartisan political shifts

Future U.S. presidents are unlikely to be as militarily supportive of Israel, motivating Israel to act now before the political shift catches up

The speed of this shift is remarkable given Israel's previously untouchable status in U.S. politics

There is no chatter in Washington about a ground invasion of Yemen; Trump's earlier air campaign against the Houthis was a disaster and was quietly ended

A ground invasion of Yemen carries greater risk and lower payoff than focusing directly on Iran

A Trump humiliated in the midterms could become more desperate and reckless, potentially changing this calculus

The normalization of this war, including casual talk of nuclear strikes, is an unhealthy trend

MECA's immediate measures were not fully thought through, as shown by the lack of Turkish/Pakistani intervention for Saudi Arabia. Any security arrangement that becomes bloc formation rather than inclusive, indivisible security will not resolve regional insecurity even if commitments are honored. MECA was aimed more at balancing Iran and deterring Israel, with Pakistan insisting on including Iran; it should have explicitly included Iran from the outset

It is increasingly unlikely Pakistan or Turkey will act meaningfully against Iran or the Houthis