What ‘Hyperpolitics’ Explains About This Era

Hyperpolitics describes a situation where political activity increases across voting, protest, and violence, but institutional strength in unions and civil society declines.

The deinstitutionalized reality of hyperpolitics means powerful mobilization periods do not seem to have lasting consequences.

Hyperpolitics involves a frenzied nature where political movements rise and fall with incredible rapidity and nothing seems to last.

Volatility is a quintessential feature of hyperpolitics because institutions normally stabilize political activity and provide longevity.

Hyperpolitics is fundamentally downstream of algorithmically mediated attention that cares about controversy and newness.

Social media acts as a magnifying glass and accelerator of trends but should not be assigned a monocausal role in explaining hyperpolitics.

People within institutions like the DSA exhibit hyperpolitical tendencies, getting overly invested in the current thing and unable to translate it over time.

Hyperpolitics affects political professionals through a decline in ideological consistency and a lack of programmatic accountability.

20th century mass politics featured hereditary, immersive party membership with high exit costs, unlike today's deinstitutionalized landscape.

The past era of totalizing parties involved indoctrination and social punishment, making it undesirable to look back on with nostalgia.

The decline of mass power institutions has negatively affected the capacity for policy change, as seen in the New Deal era and European welfare states.

American policy achievements often required unusual contingent moments like Democratic dominance or assassinations rather than linear mass power.

The mixture of constant emotional information and low individual capacity creates a feeling of powerlessness where everything happens without consent.

Increased visibility and immediacy of global events via smartphones increases political awareness but also feelings of helplessness.

Political elites are more brain-addled by social media than anyone else, creating a dynamic where the public follows the worst cues.

Hyperpolitics has compounding consequences for elites, leading to division and short-termism as seen in Elon Musk's public clashes.

Trump's mode of rule involves an implosion of time and short-termism driven by media cycles rather than ideology.

Short-termism may be structural, but figures like Vance and Rubio think in longer time frames, questioning if Trump is a harbinger or idiosyncratic.

The second Trump term is more institutionalized, but MAGA's reliance on volatile media cycles raises questions about its persistence without Trump.

MAGA increasingly resembles past eras of politics with ideas and institutions, raising the question of whether it represents hyperpolitics or something new.

Governance institutions have ossified, making it easier to block anything than achieve anything, driving political energy to low-effort discourse.

Power has moved to unelected bodies shielded from pressure, increasing the attractiveness of the veto option for both elites and the public.

The West offers individual agency without action, while China offers lack of individual agency but constant action and movement.

The West has input legitimacy through elections, while China excels at output legitimacy by delivering results despite lacking electoral systems.

Hyperpolitics may be a necessary byproduct of revitalization that breaks down ossified institutions rather than just destructive nihilism.

Hyperpolitics has ended the 'there is no alternative' dogma and increased political literacy, but needs an institutional formula to extend beyond outrage.