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Hormuz Leverage Could Become Long Term Trap

08 August 2026 · 31m

What was discussed

Conflicting accounts of Hormuz negotiations

There is confusion over who is actually negotiating the future of the Strait of Hormuz, with the Trump administration claiming close involvement while Iran insists negotiations are purely bilateral between Iran and Oman. Historical negotiation patterns since February 28th show only one direct US-Iran meeting occurred, in Islamabad, with subsequent contacts running through mediators like Pakistan and Qatar acting more as couriers than mediators.

Terms of the Iran-Oman Hormuz agreement

According to Iranian sources, any Oman-Iran deal would establish a single shipping channel jointly managed by the two littoral states, rejecting the earlier Memorandum of Understanding concept of separate northern and southern channels. A discretionary fee would apply to passing ships, and Iran maintains that reaching an agreement with Oman does not mean the Strait would reopen, since that depends on resolving the broader US-Iran conflict and the American sea blockade.

Gulf states and US opposition to the deal

A Wall Street Journal report indicated that the United States and Gulf states such as the UAE and possibly Saudi Arabia strongly oppose the emerging Iran-Oman arrangement. Oman is noted as an outlier among Gulf states, historically friendlier to Iran, and the US is expected to resist Iran gaining effective control over shipping and fees through the Strait.

Iran's motivation for maintaining Hormuz leverage

Discussion of why it is strategically puzzling for Iran to relax control over the Strait of Hormuz while still in conflict with the United States, since closure of the Strait is a key source of leverage. The mechanics of potential tanker selection, fees, and a possible voluntary international fund involving Gulf states and Europe to maintain Hormuz are examined as workarounds to avoid explicitly calling it a toll.

Internal Iranian factions on negotiation versus escalation

A hardline faction within Iran reportedly opposes any negotiations with the US, Gulf states, or Oman, advocating instead for continuing attacks while American weapons stockpiles are low. This approach is characterized as risky, potentially provoking more severe US retaliation and risking Iran's isolation from China and Russia, complicating any negotiated concessions.

US strategy of prolonging the conflict

The United States has factions willing to absorb economic costs, including high oil prices and inflation, in order to drag out the conflict, rebuild weapons stockpiles, and eventually pursue regime change in Iran. It is argued that the US retains significant capacity to find economic workarounds, including alternative oil sources, despite domestic and European economic pressures.

Recommended Iranian strategy toward BRICS partners

It is argued that Iran should prioritize economic and military cooperation with China and Russia rather than spending time on negotiations with the US and Oman, since deals with Washington have historically not been honored. Suggested steps include apologizing to China for previously favoring Western companies over Chinese contracts, securing economic stabilization deals, expediting Russian weapons deliveries, and building Caspian and Caucasus trade corridors.

Risk of closing Hormuz as a long-term trap

Closing the Strait of Hormuz is characterized as providing only temporary leverage over the United States, since global markets and oil economies will eventually develop workarounds and pipelines, causing Iran's leverage to fade over time. It is argued that indefinitely relying on Hormuz closure risks isolating Iran and weakening its long-term position rather than strengthening it.

Comparison to Syria's Assad and strategic isolation

A parallel is drawn between Iran's current hesitancy to fully commit to China and Russia and former Syrian President Assad's earlier choice to prioritize relations with Gulf states and the West while rejecting Chinese Belt and Road Initiative offers and BRICS summit invitations. This pattern of prioritizing Western-aligned partners over BRICS is presented as a cautionary precedent that led to Assad's isolation and eventual removal.

US influence over China-Iran relations

There is discussion of whether the United States has pressured China not to make deals with Iran, with reports suggesting Trump raised this issue directly with Xi Jinping in March. China's stated position is that it reserves the sovereign right to make deals with whichever countries it chooses, without making exceptions for Iran.